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theoretic literature as a “war of attrition.”1 Since such conflicts are
counter-productive and collectively irrational, they pose a difficult puzzle.
What is the underlying logic of these conflicts, why do such conflicts occur
with such regularity in the real world, and what role can law play in these
situations?
This paper is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, Part II
provides some background and presents some real-world examples of
costly and protracted wars of attrition.2 Part III examines one particular
war of attrition—what I refer to as a “legislative war of attrition”—the
current impasse over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status.3 Next, Part IV
presents an idealized two-player war of attrition model as well as a more
realistic n-player evolutionary model.4 Lastly, Part V concludes by
identifying some areas for further research.5
II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Competitive interactions often involve conflicting claims over scarce
resources. Examples range from the division of revenues among players
and owners in sports leagues to disputes over land and water rights in the
West Bank. Competitive interactions also revolve around opposing
preferences regarding public policy—such as Puerto Rico’s territorial
status. How are these conflicting claims or preferences to be decided or
resolved?
One solution method is “spontaneous order,” or the decentralized
creation and evolution of self-enforcing norms and conventions.6
However, the resulting norms and conventions may not be wealthmaximizing or mutually-beneficial. Furthermore, the conditions necessary
for the creation and evolution of self-enforcing order may not be stable or
present.7 Another solution method is centralized coercion.8 A coercive
1. See J OHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 28-39
(1982).
2. See infra Part II (introducing solution methods such as spontaneous order,
coercion, and bargaining).
3. See infra Part III (reviewing the history of and logic behind the conflict over
Puerto Rico’s status).
4. See infra Part IV (presenting mathematical models and hypothetical situations
to exemplify the author’s war of attrition theory).
5. See infra Part V (summarizing and suggesting that slight alterations of the
variables of the author’s war of attrition theory could lead to further productive
research).
6. See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989). See
generally D AVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 36-42 (1969)
(considering incidents of self-enforcing norms and conventions such as meeting in the
same location every day).
7. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, On the Origins of Property Rights 3-4 (Dec. 31, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (explaining why spontaneous-order

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol18/iss3/12

2

GUERRA-PUJOL 6/20/10

11/9/2010 7:20:41 PM

Guerra-Pujol: Insiders Versus Outsiders: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Puert

2010]

INSIDERS VERSUS OUTSIDERS

627

solution, however, presupposes the existence of an external Leviathan, a
body strong enough to impose its will. Regardless of whether a Leviathan
truly exists, coercive solutions are often perceived as illegitimate or unfair
by the losing side, leading to further conflict and unrest.9 Lastly, a more
desirable method of resolving competing claims is through bargaining.10 In
theory, negotiated solutions produce gains beneficial for both sides.11 In
practice, however, bargaining might be unfeasible or unproductive for a
wide variety of reasons, such as self-serving biases,12 high transaction
costs,13 and the existence of “infeasible” or mutually-incompatible claims.14
Consider, for example, the disastrous Major League Baseball strike/lockout of 1994-199515 and the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict over
West Bank settlements.16 These types of negative-sum conflicts are not
amenable to the classic solutions set forth above. As a result, when
conventions, external coercion, and bargaining are not practicable solutions
or are unavailable, competitive interactions often lead to a costly and
protracted stalemate among the competing sides.17 Other real-world
solutions are often unstable).
8. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115-19 (A.R. Waller, ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651) (considering the rationale behind relinquishing
power to a central authority).
9. See, e.g., EDWARD E. ZAJAC , POLITICAL E CONOMY OF F AIRNESS 129-30
(1995) (considering principles of fairness and how “fairness” factors into institutional
change).
10. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8
(1960)
11. See id. (providing an example in which both parties were made better off from
negotiation).
12. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON . PERSP. 109, 110 (1997) (arguing that
negotiating parties tend to arrive at judgments that reflect their self-serving bias,
significantly impeding settlement).
13. See Duncan Simester & Marc Knez, Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and
the Scope of the Firm, 75 J. BUS. 283, 284, 303 (2002) (explaining the bargaining costs
of negotiation, including documenting and enforcing an agreement, and that an option
with a lower cost is often more desirable).
14. See Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with
Infeasible Claims, 51 MGMT. SCI. 249 (2005) (recognizing that inconsistent feelings of
entitlement among parties historically result in unsuccessful negotiations).
15. See, e.g., Paul D. Staudohar, The Baseball Strike of 1994-95, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Mar. 1997, at 21. (examining four areas that caused negotiations between
baseball players and owners to fail and result in work stoppages: the allocation of
revenues, cooperating for mutual gain, behavioral atmosphere during bargaining, and
the accommodation of varying interests).
16. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Painful Mideast Truth: Force Trumps Diplomacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, at A4; Mark Landler & Ethan Bronner, Clinton Fails to
Win Palestinian Assent to Israeli Plan for Slowing Settlement Building, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2009, at A6 (suggesting that Middle East peace talks are proving unsuccessful
due to various issues and barriers).
17. Another possible method of resolving competing claims is the use of a random
device for assigning such claims. See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, Flipping a Coin,
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examples of this phenomenon include civil actions and civil litigation.
Although a large portion of civil actions are settled out of court,18 some
civil actions resemble costly and protracted wars of attrition. In those
cases, litigants and their attorneys find themselves locked in a no-win
situation where neither side is willing to compromise or back down.
Therefore, both plaintiff and defendant end up investing significant
resources in the contest, but their efforts cancel each other out, leading to a
Pyrrhic victory or no victory at all.19
The “war of attrition” concept, often referred to as the “Hawk-Dove
Game,” has been extensively treated in the evolutionary biology
literature.20 This paper presents a modified war of attrition model designed
to capture the essential features of the myriad conflict situations described
above. Before presenting this model, I present a detailed discussion of one
specific war of attrition for illustration.
III. THE PUERTO RICAN STATUS DEBATE AS A “LEGISLATIVE WAR OF
ATTRITION”
The century-old debate over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status, the
focus of this paper, provides another good illustration of a costly and
protracted war of attrition.21 At present, Puerto Rico is a “commonwealth,”
or territory of the United States.22 Most Puerto Ricans, however, are
dissatisfied with their Island’s current political status and thus favor some
form of change. This begs the question: what type of change? Indeed, this
question is so important to Puerto Ricans that political parties and politics
on the Island are not divided along the more familiar DemocraticDividing an Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU1 (describing an alternative
method of conflict resolution that essentially employs a random device―exemplifying
what can occur when the traditional methods of resolution fail or are unavailable).
18. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004)
(noting that only 1.8% of federal civil cases are resolved in a trial).
19. See, e.g., JONATHAN H ARR, A CIVIL A CTION 449-93 (1996) (detailing the
problems presented by civil litigation in which both parties to the described toxic tort
lawsuit were unsatisfied after their drawn-out and expensive trial).
20. See MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 10-20; D.T. Bishop & C. Cannings, A
Generalized War of Attrition, 70 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 85, 88 (1978); J. Maynard
Smith & G.R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 17 (1973)
(providing examples and interpretations of the “war of attrition,” including
mathematical models and hypothetical situations).
21. The author expresses no opinion as to whether the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico is an “incorporated” or “unincorporated” territory of the United States, since the
precise territorial status of Puerto Rico is immaterial to the results of our model.
22. Compare Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922) (holding that Puerto
Rico is an unincorporated territory), with Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan,
586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 52 (D. P.R. 2008) (stating that Puerto Rico has since become an
incorporated territory).
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Republican lines, as in the mainland United States, but rather over each
party’s preferred status solution.23
Puerto Rico has two major political parties and one minor third party.
One of the major political parties, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP),
supports an improved or “enhanced” version of Puerto Rico’s current
Commonwealth status, in which Puerto Rico would enjoy greater
autonomy in certain policy areas, such as customs, shipping, and
immigration policy.24 In the enhanced commonwealth proposal, Puerto
Ricans would still enjoy American citizenship and the right to travel to the
mainland United States. The other major Puerto Rican political party, the
New Progressive Party (NPP), supports “statehood” or annexation, with the
goal of Puerto Rico becoming the fifty-first state of the Union.25 The
Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), a minor but influential party,
supports independence or total separation from the United States.26
At this time, Puerto Rico’s two main political parties, the PDP and NPP,
have taken opposing sides on a bill that is pending before Congress, “The
Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2009” (H.R. 2499).27 In summary, this bill
would authorize “a federally-sanctioned self-determination process for the
people of Puerto Rico.”28 Specifically, the bill calls for a two-stage
referendum process, with an initial referendum at time T1 and a subsequent
referendum at time T2. The initial referendum at time T1 would propose the
following two options: Option 1: “Puerto Rico should continue to have its
present form of political status” (the status quo option), and Option 2:
“Puerto Rico should have a different political status” (the change option).29
In the event that a majority of the voters chose Option 1—the status quo
option—an identical, repeat referendum would be held after eight years
23. See generally A RTURO M ORALES CARRIÓN, P UERTO RICO: A POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL HISTORY (1983) (describing the centrality of the status issue in Puerto
Rican politics).
24. See, e.g., Congressional Panel: Enhanced Commonwealth Not an Option, P.R.
HERALD, Oct. 5, 2000, ¶¶ 4-5, http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/vol4n40/
NoEnhancedCommon-en.html [hereinafter Congressional Panel] (describing the
PDP’s enhanced commonwealth proposal as including local ability to decide which
U.S. federal laws to apply in Puerto Rico, among other components).
25. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Puerto Rico as a Critical Locality: Is a Post-Colonial
Puerto Rico Possible? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Impasse over Puerto Rico’s
Status, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (presenting NPP’s support for Puerto
Rican statehood).
26. See id. at 562-66 (describing PIP’s support for independence and using the
positions of the three major political parties to present a three-player or “true” game
model of the Puerto Rican status debate).
27. See H.R. 2499, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (presenting the bill as a Puerto
Rican referendum in which voters would choose to either continue Puerto Rico’s
current status or to change that status in an undefined way).
28. Id.
29. See id.
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with the same two options. This process would continue ad infinitum every
eight years until a majority of the voters eventually selected Option 2—the
change option. But once a simple majority of the voters agree to the
change option, the bill then calls for a final referendum at time T2 in which
the voters would choose among the following three non-territorial options:
(1) independence, (2) statehood, or (3) “sovereignty in association with the
United States.”30 One possible source of the PDP’s opposition to H.R.
2499 is the language used to describe this third option, since it is unclear
whether “sovereignty in association with the United States” is the same as
the improved or enhanced commonwealth status supported by the PDP.31
H.R. 2499, however, is simply the latest installment in a longstanding
struggle between the PDP and NPP over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status.
In summary, Puerto Rico’s main political parties have been engaged in a
costly and protracted war of attrition over the Island’s future status, which I
shall refer to as a “legislative war of attrition.” Thus far, these myriad
competing efforts appear to have cancelled each other out and produced the
current impasse over Puerto Rico’s status. Will the current effort to change
Puerto Rico’s status, H.R. 2499, suffer a similar fate of impasse, deadlock,
or stalemate?
Next, I present a symmetrical war of attrition model. My goal is not
only to explain the ultimate source of the impasse over Puerto Rico’s
constitutional status but also to understand the perverse underlying logic of
costly and protracted wars of attrition generally.
IV. A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE WARS OF ATTRITION
In this section, I discuss the utility of mathematical models in law and
present a two-player war of attrition model along with an n-player
evolutionary model.
A. A Few Words about the Utility of Models in Law
Before proceeding, I wish to make a few points about the utility of
game-theoretic models in law. Most legal literature is based on purely
verbal arguments. However, the problem with purely verbal arguments is
that they tend to be imprecise, fuzzy, and vague.32 The “looseness” of most
30. See id. § 2(a)-(b).
31. Compare id. § 2(c)(2) (defining “sovereignty in association with the United

States” as a “political association” between the same nations), with Congressional
Panel, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4-5 (describing the enhanced commonwealth proposal, which
includes a permanent connection to the United States, citizenship for Puerto Ricans,
U.S. government benefits without taxes, and the Puerto Rican government’s ability to
choose which U.S. laws it wants to apply).
32. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF , ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION 73-80 (1991) (discussing the “level of generality” problem―the way
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verbal arguments leads to confusion and unproductive squabbling among
scholars, who end up arguing back-and-forth for years about the meaning
and implications of their verbal models.
Of course, I recognize at the outset that game-theoretic models and
mathematical models are generally much simpler than the real-world
scenarios they are designed to depict. For example, the models in this
paper are highly stylized and based on a finite set of simplifying
assumptions, such as symmetrical payoffs and a well-defined strategy set
consisting of only two choices. In addition, I ignore the psychology of
sunk costs, the problem of stochastic effects (such as random shocks), and
the possibility of altruism or “other-regarding” behavior. Nevertheless,
what models sacrifice in specificity and detail, they gain in tractability and
clarity. In the words of two contemporary game theorists, “models are
simple maps for understanding the consequences of a small number of key
assumptions.”33 In addition, formal models may help to uncover the
underlying logic or unifying structure of seemingly unrelated situations.
Then, and only then, after stating the operating assumptions of these
models up front, do I attempt to explain the results of these models in
words.
B. A Two-Player War of Attrition Model
This two-player war of attrition model consists of a one-shot,
simultaneous-move game in which the players, designated as Player A and
Player B, support opposing positions on a given issue or public policy
debate. I begin with this simple scenario first for ease of exposition. Later
in this subsection, I consider an infinite version of the game.
In addition, I make the following set of assumptions: each player prefers
that his policy position prevails and obtains the positive payoff (v) if his
position indeed prevails. For simplicity, I assume that the intensity of each
player’s preferences are equal. That is, I assume that the value of v is
fixed. Also, the players must simultaneously choose between one of two
possible strategies at the outset of the game: hawk or dove. The hawk
strategy is the equivalent of fighting, and there is no bluffing in this game;
the player who fights always pays a cost (c) to obtain his or her desired
policy goal. The dove strategy, in contrast, consists of backing down or
retreating. By choosing to back down, the player does not pay the cost of
fighting. Unlike some hawk-dove models in the previous literature, in this

the Supreme Court determines how generally constitutional rights are meant to be
interpreted).
33. RICHARD MC ELREATH & ROBERT BOYD, MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF
SOCIAL E VOLUTION 4-6 (2007).
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model there are no display costs.34 Lastly, I assume that the benefit or
value of prevailing (v) is always larger than the cost of fighting (c), so v is
greater than c. The intuition behind this assumption is that the players are
unlikely to fight when the cost of fighting outweighs the utility of
prevailing or the value of the contested resource, as the case may be.
Notice that I specify the respective benefits and costs corresponding with
each strategy in abstract terms (the parameters v and c) rather than
expressing them in terms of numerical values (such as 1, 2, and 3) in order
to illustrate the underlying logic and structure of seemingly unrelated
problems. In addition, another advantage of expressing these values as
abstract parameters is flexibility and generality; that is, this abstract model
permits me to derive results for any value that these parameters might
actually take.35
Since this is a game-theoretic or interactive model, the payoffs depend
on the strategies simultaneously chosen by the players at the start of play.
The structure of the game and the payoffs can be expressed in “extended
form” (see Figure 1a) as follows:

34. In some models, doves pay a display cost when they pretend to adopt the hawk
strategy for some time period t before deciding to back down. See generally
MAYNARD S MITH, supra note 1, at 149 (evaluating the success and long-term indicator
of displays).
35. See MCELREATH & BOYD, supra note 33, at 4-6 (explaining that game theory
models are deliberately general in order to eliminate variables that are irrelevant to a
given study and allow researchers to understand complex phenomena at a micro level,
one detail at a time).
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Figure 1a
Extended form (game tree) symmetrical war of attrition
game with two players and two strategies
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The payoffs can also be expressed in “normal form” (see Figure 1b) as follows:

Player B
chooses hawk

,

Player A
chooses hawk

Player A
chooses dove

Player B
chooses dove

0,

,0

0, 0

Figure 1b
Normal form payoff table of symmetrical war of attrition
game with two players and two strategies

Accordingly, there are four possible interactions in the one-shot game:
(1) hawk-dove, (2) dove-hawk, (3) dove-dove, and (4) hawk-hawk,
resulting in four possible payoff combinations. For instance, if Player A
chooses hawk and Player B chooses dove, then Player A receives a positive
payoff minus the cost of fighting (v – c), while Player B obtains no
payoff.36 This result occurs because Player A is more likely to obtain his
desired policy change if the other player does not fight back, though Player
A still ends up paying the cost of fighting. Likewise, if Player A chooses
dove while Player B chooses hawk, the payoffs are reversed: Player A gets
nothing while Player B gets v – c.
In the event of a dove-dove interaction in which both players choose to
back down instead of fighting, neither prevails or obtains his preferred
36. The payoff to the dove player in this scenario might, in fact, be negative. My
student, Nadine Sfeir, has pointed out to me that although such a player avoids the cost
of fighting, his choice of the dove strategy might generate a reputation for backing
down and weaken his ability to fight in future rounds. Nevertheless, since this model
consists of a single, one-round game, I ignore reputation costs and the like for
simplicity.
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policy outcome and both players receive a zero payoff. The reason for a
zero payoff (instead of v/2 as in the classic hawk-dove game) is that in this
model, both players prefer change to retaining the status quo, but when
both players back down, the status quo is preserved by default.37 Lastly, if
both players choose to fight, resulting in a hawk-hawk interaction, then
both players end up paying the cost of fighting (c) and neither prevails
because, by fighting, their efforts cancel each other out, leading to a
preservation of the status quo, a state of affairs that neither player prefers.
At this point, it is worth noting that one aspect of this war of attrition
model shares some similarities with a model often referred to as the “Game
of Chicken.”38 In the Game of Chicken, there are two players driving race
cars towards each other at high speeds on a one lane road. Like the binary
strategy set forth in this model, the strategy set of the drivers in the Game
of Chicken consists of two choices: swerve or drive straight. If both
players drive straight, there will be a serious collision and thus a cost will
be imposed on both drivers. Similarly, if the players in the war of attrition
model both fight, they both pay the cost of fighting.
Nevertheless, this model differs from the Game of Chicken in two
important dimensions. One difference is the treatment of cooperative
interactions, the “swerve-swerve” and “dove-dove” interactions. In the war
of attrition model, dove-dove interactions produce a zero payoff for both
players since both avoid the cost of fighting and since neither is able to
impose his desired outcome on the other player. In the Game of Chicken,
however, swerve-swerve interactions produce a small positive payoff for
both players because both drivers avoid being the sole “chicken.”
Another difference between this model and the Game of Chicken is the
treatment of mixed-type interactions, such as “swerve-drive straight” and
“dove-hawk” interactions. In this model, when a dove interacts with a
hawk, the dove’s payoff is zero. He avoids the cost of fighting, and the
other player’s win does not impose a cost on the dove. In contrast, the
worst possible outcome in the Game of Chicken is to swerve if the player is
going to drive straight. The player that swerves not only obtains a negative
payoff (since he has lost the contest), but also this negative payoff is
greater than the negative payoff generated when both players drive straight.
The logic of this result is that the driver that swerves is the sole “chicken.”
That is, although a head-on collision produces a negative payoff, neither
player can be called a “chicken,” an epithet deemed worse than the cost of

37. As my colleague Carlos del Valle has pointed out to me, a dove-dove
interaction might produce a positive payoff, a “peace dividend.” However, analysis of
this type of payoff is outside the scope of our current inquiry.
38. See, e.g., W ILLIAM P OUNDSTONE, P RISONER’ S DILEMMA 197-201 (1993).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010

11

GUERRA-PUJOL 6/20/10

11/9/2010 7:20:41 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 12

636

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 18:3

a head-on collision.39
Before proceeding, it is also worth taking a moment to describe the
salient differences between the hawk-dove model presented in this paper
and the traditional or classical hawk-dove model that appears in the game
theory literature.40 For reference, I shall refer to the traditional hawk-dove
model as the “Maynard Smith model” to contrast it with the model
presented in this paper, which I shall refer to as the modified war of
attrition model, which differs from the Maynard Smith model in the
following dimensions:
1. Biological versus social science approach
The focus of the classical Maynard Smith model is animal conflict.41
Specifically, the Maynard Smith model is designed to explain the
prevalence of “display” behavior in nature in which many species of
animals settle contests without resort to actual fighting. The focus of my
model, in contrast, is on actual human conflict, such as conflicts over
public policy or scarce resources, and not on mere display behavior.42
2. Dove-dove interactions
Dove-dove interactions in the Maynard Smith model produce a payoff of
v/2 for both players because the players are assumed to share the resource
or, in the alternative, because the winner of the contest is selected at
random, so that each player wins half of the time.43 In my model, by
contrast, I assume more realistically that when both players choose to back
39. The Game of Chicken thus raises an intriguing possibility: under what
conditions might the dove strategy in our model generate a negative payoff? For
example, there might be a cost to backing down (choosing dove) when the other player
chooses hawk, such as a reputation cost. In addition, backing down at time T1 might
affect the outcome of a future contest at time T2. That is, one’s choice of strategy may
have a “path-dependent effect.” In the standard war of attritions model in the existing
literature, the outcome of hawk-hawk and dove-dove interactions are completely
random. See, e.g., MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 12-13. However, one could
imagine a more complex or dynamic model in which the choice of strategy during one
round of play increases or decreases the distribution of payoffs in future rounds of the
game. The intuition behind this idea is as follows: if A plays hawk and B plays dove
during the first round of play, A not only wins the first round, A is also in a better
position to win future rounds of play even if B later switches to hawk. Nevertheless,
we ignore this possibility in our model for the sake of simplicity.
40. See generally MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 11-20 (detailing the numerous
variables that are considered in the traditional model).
41. See id. at 10-12 (noting that the use of the word “strategy” in describing game
theory is derived from animal behavior, specifically when animals compete over
resources).
42. See infra Part IV.C (developing an evolutionary or biological model).
43. See MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 13 (rationalizing that if the resource
cannot be shared, the cost is minimal since in the dove-dove interaction, the contestants
are more prone to “display” and thus not injure each other).
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down, neither player wins the contest, leading to a zero payoff (instead of
v/2) for both players.
3. Hawk-hawk interactions
Lastly, in the Maynard Smith model the outcome of a hawk-hawk
interaction is determined at random, leading to a payoff of (v – c)/2,
because the players are assumed to be equally-matched.44 My model
likewise assumes that the players are equally matched, but I reach a
fundamentally different conclusion from this baseline assumption. I
conclude that neither player wins the contest, leading to a negative payoff
of – c instead of (v – c)/2 for both players, since their efforts are likely to
cancel each other out, producing a costly war of attrition and preserving the
status quo.
This approach to hawk-hawk interactions provides the key to
understanding the inherently negative-sum nature of costly and protracted
wars of attrition: when both sides choose to fight, neither side wins because
a hawk-hawk interaction increases the likelihood of stalemate. Why?
When both sides expend resources fighting for their respective policy
outcomes, their efforts cancel each other out, leading to a costly war of
attrition with no change in the status quo. Consider once again the Puerto
Rican status debate and other examples set forth in Part II of this paper: the
Major League Baseball strike of 1994-199545 and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict over West Bank settlements.46 Both sides in these myriad conflicts
prefer to see their respective positions prevail, but by refusing to negotiate
or surrender to the demands of other side, the warring factions end up
perpetuating a negative-sum conflict in which all sides are worse off.
Nevertheless, despite these differences, my modified model shares the
same underlying logic and structure of the Maynard Smith model: in both
models, the individual players are competing against each other, they are
acting as proxies for strategies (either hawk or dove), and their strategies
are set at the start of the game. Also, in both models the hawk strategy
(fighting) can be compared to defection, while dove (backing down) is
more akin to cooperation. That is, if both players choose to back down,
then neither gets its preferred outcome, but neither pays the cost of fighting
either, perhaps allowing time for a mutually-beneficial compromise
44. See id. at 12-13 (reasoning that each hawk contestant has a 50% chance of
injuring the other contestant and winning the resource, and also a 50% chance of being
injured by the other contestant and losing the resource).
45. See Staudohar, supra note 15, at 26 (documenting the losses that both Major
League Baseball players and owners suffered during the strike).
46. See Bronner, supra note 16 (discussing the costs borne by both Israelis and
Palestinians as a result of barriers, checkpoints, and other security procedures in place
to prevent military escalation).
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solution or a negotiated settlement. If both choose to fight, however,
neither obtains its preferred outcome, yet both end up paying the cost of
fighting.
Having compared and contrasted the classical Maynard Smith hawkdove model with my modified war of attrition model, I now proceed to find
the existence of Nash Equilibria47 in the modified model. That is, what is
the likely outcome of this revised hawk-dove game?
In summary, there are two pure-strategy equilibria in the modified oneshot game. This conclusion becomes apparent once one evaluates each
player’s best response to the other. Given the payoff structure of this
modified hawk-dove model (as set forth in Figures 1a and 1b above), hawk
is the best response to dove because v – c is greater than 0, while dove is
the best response to hawk because 0 is greater than c. That is, Player A
prefers to fight if Player B is going to back down, and vice-versa, Player B
prefers to back down if Player A is going to fight. Nevertheless, this is not
the outcome one observes in the war of attrition scenarios described in
Parts II and III above.48 In the absence of conventions, external coercion,
or bargaining, one observes that a conflict often escalates into a costly and
protracted war of attrition. How can one explain the persistence of such
wars of attrition (hawk-hawk interactions), in so many myriad types of
conflict scenarios?
One source of this incongruity is the simultaneous-move nature of the
modified hawk-dove game. Being a simultaneous-move game, neither
player can observe the other player’s move ahead of time, so the players
could end up choosing the same strategies (hawk-hawk or dove-dove),
leading to sub-optimal payoffs for both players. For example, both players
might be committed ex ante to fighting—hoping in vain that the other
player has chosen to back down—leading to a costly and pointless war of
attrition in which both players end up fighting.
Another source of negative-sum hawk-hawk interactions is the
possibility of mixed strategies. In place of a single, pure strategy (hawk or
dove), the players might select a probabilistic mix of hawk-dove
combinations, playing the hawk strategy, for example, with probability p
and choosing dove with probability 1 – p. Once I introduce the possibility
of mixed strategies, one can easily determine the probability of a hawkhawk interaction, that is, the probability that the game will turn into a war
47. See Guilherme Carmona, Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity
in Large Games, 11 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 10, 12 (2009) (defining a Nash Equilibrium
as one in which all players choose the optimal strategy for themselves, while taking
into account the actions of the other players, and each player cannot be better off by
changing his strategy if the other players do not change theirs); see also John Nash, The
Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
48. Supra Parts II & III.
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of attrition.
Consider an infinite version of this two-player hawk-dove war of
attrition game. That is, instead of a one-shot or single-round game, I now
imagine a potentially never-ending game consisting of an infinite or
endless number of rounds. For example, returning to some of the conflict
scenarios set forth in Part II, one could model the long-standing debates
over Puerto Rican status or the Middle East conflict as an endless hawkdove game. Indeed, this idea is explicit in H.R. 2499, which proposes a
potentially never-ending series of referenda if a majority of the voters fail
to approve Option 2, the option to change Puerto Rico’s status.49 In
summary, the payoff structure of the infinite game is identical to that of the
one-shot game, since each individual round of the infinite game provides
the same payoffs to the players as the one-shot game does. Furthermore, I
assume the players avoid the “sunk cost fallacy” and ignore their previous
payoffs (i.e., accumulated losses and wins during the previous rounds of
play) because such previous payoffs are, in essence, sunk costs and thus
have no bearing on the current round being played. The sunk cost fallacy
assumes that a player considers their past decisions, and that their prior
investment in fighting commits them to future investment. In ignoring
sunk costs, I assume that the players act rationally and consider instead
their expected or future payoffs in deciding his optimal strategy and thus in
deciding whether to continue playing at all.50 Later, in Part IV.C below, I
relax this rationality assumption.Before proceeding, it is worth noting that
the infinite version of the game will end only when one or both of the
players decide to stop playing the game, either because one of the players
has accumulated too many losses during the course of the game, leading to
his voluntary surrender, or because both players are able to opt-out of the
game altogether through a negotiated settlement or compromise solution.
In this model, however, I assume that the players have an unlimited amount
of resources to fight and that negotiations are not feasible.
What is the optimal strategy in the infinite game? Since neither player
knows with certainty the strategy of the other player, the optimal approach
might consist of a mixed strategy in which a player is indifferent to playing
either hawk or dove. Consider Player A, although my analysis applies
equally to both Players A and Player B since the payoffs in this model are
49. See supra notes 27-31; see also H.R. Res. 2499 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (as
reported by H. Comm. on Natural Res., Oct. 8, 2009) (declaring that if Option 1 is
selected, Puerto Rico will only be able to reassess their status every eight years,
whereas Option 2 lists three choices which would allow Puerto Rico to reach a final
resolution on this ongoing debate).
50. See, e.g., RICHARD D AWKINS , THE SELFISH GENE 150 (Oxford Univ. Press
1989) (1976) (analogizing situations where investors opt to cut their losses and
abandon currently unproductive projects regardless of how much they have already
invested to courtship rituals between males and coy females).
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symmetrical for both players. Here, I introduce the related ideas of
expected payoff and probability. That is, Player A’s expected payoff from
playing a given strategy (say, hawk) depends on the probability (p) that
Player B might also play hawk as well as the probability (1 – p) that Player
B might choose dove.
Thus, if Player A chooses hawk, Player A will pay a cost –c with
probability p and will obtain the payoff v – c with probability 1 – p. Recall
that p is the probability that Player B also plays hawk, while 1 – p is the
probability that Player B plays dove. Accordingly, the expected payoff (V)
to Player A of playing hawk [V(H)] can thus be expressed mathematically
as follows:51
V(H) = (–c)(p) + (v – c)(1 – p)

(1.1)

Likewise, Player A’s expected payoff from choosing the dove strategy
[V(D)] can be expressed in the following form:
V(D) = (0)(p) + (0)(1 – p)
V(D) = 0

(1.2)

That is, if Player A chooses dove, then Player A receives a zero payoff
because, regardless of the other player’s strategy, the dove strategy always
produces a zero payoff against both hawk and dove, given my initial
assumptions.
Lastly, I determine Player A’s optimal mixed strategy [V’(A)] by setting
equations 1.1 and 1.2 equal to each other, substituting p’ for p, and solving
for p’ as follows:
(–c)(p’) + (v – c)(1 – p’) = 0
–cp’ + v – c – vp’ + cp’ = 0
v – c – vp’ = 0
vp’ = v – c
p’ = (v – c)/v = V’(A) = V’(B)

(1.3)

In other words, Player A’s optimal mixed strategy is to play hawk with a
probability equal to (v – c)/v and dove with probability 1 – (v – c)/v. Notice
that the optimal mixed strategy is actually the same for both players since
the payoffs in this modified model are symmetrical.
Assuming v is greater than c, each player’s optimal strategy in the
51. I present the complete details of our algebraic analysis so that the careful reader
can follow each step of our analysis.
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infinite game is to play hawk (fight) with a probability equal to the ratio
that appears on the right-hand side of the above equation. This ratio is a
function of the stakes of the contest (v) and the cost of fighting (c) and
increases as the numerical value of v increases and decreases as the value
of c increases. Thus, when v > c, there is a proportional relationship
between the variables p’ and v but an inverse relationship between p’ and c.
Having determined the probability that either player will play hawk
(equation 1.3 above), I will now find the probability that any given round
of play will result in a hawk-hawk interaction, that is, the probability that
both players will simultaneously play hawk in round n of play, where n is
any individual round of play. In summary, since both players will choose
the hawk strategy with probability p’ due to the symmetrical payoff
structure of the game, the probability that both players play hawk on any
given round of play is simply p’ × p’, or p’2. Similarly, the probability that
hawk-hawk interactions occur on two consecutive rounds of play is p’2 ×
p’2, or p’4.Since the value of p’ (and thus the value of p’2) is a function of
the stakes of the contest (v) and the cost of fighting (c), my modified hawkdove model conveys a valuable insight about real-world symmetrical wars
of attrition. In essence, the lesson is this: the larger the stakes of the
conflict (the higher v is), the larger the probability of fighting. By the same
token, the larger the cost of fighting (the higher c is), the smaller the
probability of fighting. Thus far, I have presented a two-player war of
attrition model. In the next subsection, I consider a more realistic n-player
evolutionary model.
C. An n-Player Evolutionary War of Attrition Model
In place of the two-player model above, I now consider an n- or multiplayer modified hawk-dove model. The n-player model operates on the
following assumptions: the population consists of a large number of
individuals; during each round of play, two individuals selected at random
from the population meet and engage in a micro-conflict; and as before,
there are only two possible strategies or types of individuals: hawk and
dove. Lastly, I further assume that these strategies are transmitted through
an asexual inheritance mechanism: the victor of each two-pair, microconflict not only survives but also produces a descendant-clone who
asexually inherits the victor’s strategy; the loser, in contrast, is eliminated
from the population. If the conflict ends in a draw or tie, both contestants
survive but neither produces a descendant.
Given these assumptions, which strategy will be favored by natural
selection? To answer this question, I proceed in two stages. First, I restate
the payoff (V) corresponding to each possible interaction. Since the
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payoffs are the same as before,52 and since there are four possible microinteractions in all (hawk-hawk, hawk-dove, dove-hawk, and dove-dove),
the payoffs corresponding to each interaction can be written as follows:
V(H│H)
hawk)
V(H│D)
dove)
V(D│H)
V(D│D)
dove)

= –c (the payoff to a hawk, given that it interacts with another
= v – c (the payoff to a hawk, given that it interacts with a
= 0 (the payoff to a dove, given that it interacts with a hawk)
= 0 (the payoff to a dove, given that it interacts with another

On the left-hand side, I have written the payoffs corresponding to each
interaction in mathematical form, and on the right-hand side, I have
“translated” the mathematical notation into plain English for the nonmathematical reader. Notice too that, because of the symmetrical nature of
this model, for simplicity I state the payoffs of the row player only (Player
A). In a population model, the fitness of a given strategy is said to be
“frequency dependent” because the success or fitness of a strategy depends
not only on the frequency of the other strategy but also on that strategy’s
own frequency.53 When fitness (rate of survival) is frequency dependent,
evolutionary game theory helps one to determine which strategies are
“evolutionarily stable strategies” and thus to find the long-run evolutionary
equilibrium of the population—that is, the frequency of hawks and doves
over many generations. Specifically, I wish to answer the following two
questions:
(1) Is either the hawk or dove strategy able to resist invasion by the other
strategy?
(2) If no strategy is evolutionarily stable (i.e. able to resist invasion by
the other strategy), is there an evolutionarily stable mix of strategies?
Let p be the frequency of hawks in the population and 1 – p the
frequency of doves in the population. First, consider a population in which
the frequency of hawks is very high (p ≈ 1). Under this scenario, hawks
rarely interact with doves because the frequency of doves is very low (1 – p
≈ 0), and thus the expected or average payoff (W) when the player acts as a
hawk (H) is determined by her interactions with other hawks as follows:
W(H) = w’ + (1)[ V (H│H)] + (1 – 1)[ V (H│D)]
52. Cf. Figure 1b, supra Part IV:B.
53. See MCELREATH & BOYD, supra note 33, at 38 (citing the significance of

evolutionary game theory in determining when it best pays an individual to fight or flee
based on the actions of the individual’s opponent).
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W(H) = w’ + V (H│H)
W(H) = w’ – c

Note that the parameter w’ in this equation refers to the “baseline
fitness” of all the individuals in the population—that is, the probability of
survival from generation to generation—and thus reflects the strength of
selection on a given population.54 For convenience, I assume that w’ is
larger than c, the cost of fighting.
Now, consider the possibility of a rare dove-like mutant. What would
happen if a hawk were to interact with this rare dove mutant? Will the
dove strategy begin to spread across the population, gradually displacing
the hawks, or will the hawk strategy be able to resist invasion? To answer
this question, I determine the average fitness of the rare dove mutants
among the population of hawks. Since doves are rare (1 – p ≈ 0), the
chance one dove will meet another dove is likewise small. As a result, the
average fitness of a rare dove [W(D)] is determined by his interaction with
hawks as follows:
W(D) = w’ + V (D│H)
W(D) = w’ + 0
W(D) = w’

Notice, then, that in a population of hawks, the rare doves will on
average outperform the hawks because W(D) is larger than W(H). In other
words, doves will invade the population and displace hawks because the
average fitness of each dove (w’) is on average higher than the average
fitness of each hawk (w’ – c). Hawks will not be able to resist an invasion
of doves. But can a population of doves resist an invasion of hawks?
Consider next a population in which the frequency of doves is very high
(1 – p ≈ 1). Since doves rarely interact with hawks when the frequency of
hawks is low (p ≈ 0), the average fitness of a dove [W(D)] is determined by
her interactions with other doves as follows:
W(D) = w’ + (1)[ V(D│D)] + (1 – 1)[ V(D│H)]
W(D) = w’ + V(D│D)
W(D) = w’ + 0
W(D) = w’

What would happen if a rare hawk-like mutant were to appear on the
54. See id. at 40-41 (noting that when the baseline fitness is large in comparison to
the effect of the behavior in question, gene frequencies change more slowly than if the
baseline fitness is small).
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scene? Since hawks are rare (p ≈ 0), the hawk mutant will interact mostly
with the doves and her average fitness [W(H)] is thus as follows:
W(H) = w’ + V(H│D)
W(H) = w’ + v – c

Thus, in a population of doves, the rare hawks will on average do better
than the doves because W(H) is larger than W(D) when the baseline fitness
is larger than the cost of fighting. Just as doves will invade a population of
hawks, in this case hawks will invade a population of doves and eventually
displace the doves because the average fitness of each hawk (w’ + v – c) is
on average higher than the average fitness of each dove (w’) when v is
greater than c. Accordingly, these results suggest that neither hawk nor
dove is an evolutionarily stable strategy because neither strategy is able to
resist invasion by the other. But is there some stable mix of hawks and
doves? And if so, what is it? That is, in the long-run, what proportion of
the population will be hawks, and what proportion will be doves?
To find this mixed or “polymorphic” population equilibrium, one must
first determine the expected or average payoff (W) corresponding to each
strategy across a large number of interactions. Since the expected payoffs
depend on the overall frequency or proportion of hawks and doves in the
population, again let p be the frequency of hawks in the population and 1–
p the frequency of doves in the population. Then, assuming that
individuals interact at random, I obtain the expected fitness of a hawk as
follows:
W(H) = w’ + (p)[ V(H│H)] + (1 – p)[ V(H│D)]
W(H) = w’ + (p)(–c) + (1 – p)(v – c)
W(H) = w’ – pc + v – c – pv + pc
W(H) = w’ + v – c – pv

(2.1)

Similarly, I obtain the expected fitness of a dove [W(D)] as follows (and,
again, recall that the parameter w’ is the average fitness or baseline fitness
of all individuals in the population):
W(D) = w’ + (p)[V(D│H)] + (1 – p)[V(D│D)]
W(D) = w’ + (p)(0) + (1 – p)(0)
W(D) = w’ + 0 + 0
W(D) = w’

(2.2)

Having determined the expected fitness of hawks and doves, I next
proceed to find the frequency at which there is an evolutionarily stable mix
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of hawks and doves in the population by setting p = p’ and W(D) = W(H)
and solving for p’ as follows:
W(D) = W(H)
w’ = w’ + v – c – p’v
p’v = v – c
p’ = (v – c)/v

(2.3)

Notice the striking parallel between the results of this evolutionary
population model and results of the standard two-player game-theoretic
model in the previous subsection of this paper. Specifically, under the
standard model an individual player’s optimal mixed strategy is to play
hawk with a probability equal to (v – c)/v.55 Similarly, the equivalent
evolutionary model demonstrates that the evolutionarily stable proportion
of hawks in a large population is also equal to the same ratio: (v – c)/v.
In addition, like my previous model, the evolutionary model produces
two qualitatively different outcomes depending on the ratio of v to c.
When the value of the resource exceeds the cost of fighting (v > c), hawks
will displace doves from the population, and the larger v is in relation to c,
the greater the proportion of the population will consist of hawks. But
when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the contested resource (v <
c), then doves will outperform hawks, and the larger c is in relation to v, the
greater the proportion of doves will be. In both cases, the population will
consist of a mix of doves and hawks, with the actual proportion of this mix
depending on the magnitudes of v and c.
V. CONCLUSION
I conclude this paper by identifying the following three questions as
fruitful areas for future research:
(1) What happens when the payoffs are asymmetrical instead of
symmetrical?
In this paper, I have assumed for the sake of simplicity that the cost of
fighting (c) and the stakes of the contest (v) are symmetrical for the players.
In reality, however, although both players might prefer some form of
change to the status quo, they will often disagree on the extent of the
desired change. One player might prefer a radical or “hard” change to the
status quo (the “hard player”), while the other player might prefer a small
or “soft” change (the “soft player”). In other words, the stakes of the
conflict and thus the cost of fighting might be asymmetrical for the

55. Cf. Equation 1.3, supra Part IV.B.
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players.56
(2) What happens if the values of the parameters v and c change over
time?
Another interesting question for future research is to consider the
possibility that v and c might not be fixed but might change over time.
That is, the payoffs might be dynamic instead of static. For example, the
value of the contested resource might grow with time. By the same token,
the cost of fighting might vary over time as tactics and technology change.
Thus, one could build a model in which either v or c (or both) change by
some constant k. This constant might be fixed in which v increases by
some factor k’ during each round of play, or it might be probabilistic,
varying from 0 to 1 according to some random mechanism.
(3) Is there a link between payoffs in a given round and the outcome of
future rounds?
Lastly, another interesting idea for future work is the possibility of the
players becoming stronger or weaker over time, i.e., during successive
rounds of play. One could imagine a model in which previous gains
increase the probability of future gains—and in which losses during
previous rounds of play increase the probability of future losses. The
intuition here is that one’s previous choices will not only have an effect on
one’s future choices, but will also affect the likely outcome of the future
rounds of the game. For example, instead of the outcome of a hawk-hawk
interaction or dove-dove interaction being decided randomly, as in the
Maynard Smith model, the outcome of such interactions might be based on
the relative strength of each player, which in turn would depend on the
outcome of previous rounds of play.
Also, in this paper I do not consider the accumulated payoffs (both losses
and gains) from previous rounds of play, since such payoffs are, in effect,
sunk costs. But in real life, the outcomes of previous rounds of play do
have an effect on the psychology of the players. Moreover, once one
assumes that the resources available to the players are scarce or subject to
some upper limit and that the selection and implementation of a strategy is
not costless,57 then it becomes imperative to keep track of losses and gains
56. For example, returning to H.R. 2499, the debate over Puerto Rico’s
constitutional status is, in essence, a strategic contest between hard and soft players in
which the existing Commonwealth status serves as the status quo position. The NPP
and the PIP support the statehood and independence options, respectively. Both
options constitute hard changes to the status quo. The PDP, in contrast, prefers an
“enhanced” or improved Commonwealth, a softer or more incremental change. But
many members of the PDP as well as the PIP prefer the status quo to statehood; that is,
they perceive the Commonwealth status as a “lesser evil” than statehood. See supra
notes 24-26.
57. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 E CONOMICA 386, 390-91
(1937) (surmising that if there were no limits, the situation would be analogous to
voluntary slavery).
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during the rounds of play.
One possibility for doing this might be to present the model in visual
form. For example, whether the players are contesting rights to land,
access to water, or shares of revenue, the sum value of the contested
resource (land, water, revenue) might be presented visually in the form of a
circle. This circle, in turn, would consist of two colors, such a blue and
green, with blue representing one player’s share of the contested resource
and green representing the other player’s share. The idea here is to present
visually the changes over time to each player’s share of the contested
resource during successive rounds of play.
*

*

*

Summing up, competing interactions over scarce resources or over the
content of public policy can result in radically different outcomes.
Consistent with Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor of markets, some
interactions might lead to a positive-sum equilibrium in which everyone
benefits from mutual cooperation.58 Other interactions, in contrast, might
produce a negative-sum Hobbesian equilibrium in which everyone is worse
off because of mutual defection.59 For example, when conventions,
coercion, and bargaining are not available for achieving a positive-sum
outcome, a competitive interaction might result in a costly and protracted
war of attrition.
Furthermore, negative-sum wars of attrition abound in the real world.
Consider, once again, the centennial debate over Puerto Rico’s
constitutional status, the stand-off between the player’s union and baseball
club owners during the Major League Baseball strike/lock-out of 19941995, and the long-standing conflict between Israel and Palestine over
disputed water rights and the construction of Jewish settlements in the West
Bank. In all these conflicts, the contending parties are locked in a costly
and protracted negative-sum war of attrition.
In this paper, I have attempted to determine the conditions under which a
hawk-hawk interaction or costly war of attrition is most likely to occur, and
I have shown that when the payoffs are symmetrical and bluffing is not
permitted, the probability of a player choosing the hawk strategy (or the
proportion of the population consisting of hawks) is a function of the stakes

58. See, e.g., Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. R EV.
BIOLOGY 35, 45-46 (1971) (analyzing human reciprocal altruism and how all members
can benefit when sharing food, tools, and knowledge).
59. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 50, at 203 (providing examples of the four
types of outcomes possible under game theory and delineating how both players lose if
both choose to “defect”).
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of the contest (v) and the cost of fighting (c) and increases as the numerical
value of v increases and decreases as the value of c increases. The larger
the stakes of the conflict are—that is, the higher v is in relation to c—the
larger the probability of fighting (or the greater the proportion of hawks in
the population). In the alternative, the larger the cost of fighting is—the
higher c is in relation to v—the smaller the probability of fighting (or the
smaller the proportion of hawks in the population). In real-life terms, this
analysis suggests that certain public policy and legal disputes are more
likely to result in intractable war of attritions where the stakes of the
contest are larger in relation to the costs of fighting. This analysis also
suggests that one way of preventing such wars of attrition is by increasing
the cost of fighting relative to the value of prevailing.
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